Women And Personal Status Law In Iraq Politics Essay

Wo men And Personal Status Law In Iraq Politics EssayPersonal Status faithfulness is the term applied to those provisions in a farmings constitution that refer to the areas of marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. In many countries these impartialitys are constructed as part of a secular, civil code, with independent courts adjudicating disputes. Historically women drop been much to a greater extent gauzy to ainised side equitys, also referred to as family police, because of their position in the household as caregivers and matriarchs. The laws that pertain to personal side in Iraq have infragone three important periods of transmutation in pre-Gulf War Iraq, the original law of personal status was set in place on December 30, 1959 several of the provisions (articles) were therefore amended, a few dropped, and several more added end-to-end the 1970s post-Gulf War Iraq was a crucial turning point in the transformation of the code when women began to visit a decl ine in their personal status flops the laws were altered yet again as a consequence of the U.S. light-emitting diode invasion in 2003 and the mechanical drawing of a new Iraki Constitution. By looking at these three time periods and the prevailing political atmospheres, we can then see the negative transformation and state manipulation of the personal status law. The future of the status of women in Iraq and their rights as recognized in a personal status code give also be discussed. It will be clear from this examination that while women have been successful in exerting some influence on laws of personal status in Iraq, more often than non the laws have been manipulated as a political tool by those in tycoon, irreverent of the needs or wants of the countrys young-bearing(prenominal) population.It is important to consider the development of international tender rights perceptions in relation to the current debate in the Middle East. The objective of this framework is to pro vide a foundation from which we can understand the line of significant tension between Sharia Law and Personal Status Law. valet rights formed in the watt during the European Enlightenment. The idea that the rights of the individual should be of par follow importance in a political system emerged and the emphasis on individualism, humanism, and rationalism (Mayer, 44) is the basis for modern-day international human rights principles. These Western foundations do well to explain the cause of tension between the West and Islam over human rights but to understand where the source of tension lies, we moldiness look at Islam as an institution.Islam is the cornerstone of Middle East culture and tradition. Regardless of modernization efforts, Muslim primacy still remains. The dominance of piety affects all aspects of life including the human rights discourse and, as a result, the Moslem position on human rights is complex. Muslims do not have a commonplace belief about what the Islam ic position on human rights is or the kin of their cultural tradition to international human rights norms (Mayer, 11). The Middle East, by nature, is a deeply penetrated region dealing with the impact of Western persuasion throughout its history. Human rights concepts are just another standard that the Middle East has had to engage and apply to their countries. However, these concepts are also part of accepted international law and by acknowledging international law as the law of nations (Mayer, 12), Muslims are bound to these norms. Thus, Muslim rejection to international human rights on the basis of Islam is contradictory.Historically, there is no human rights tradition in Islamic civilization (Mayer, 73) and no existing criteria as to how Islamic institutions limit international human rights or is there any detail of what these restrictions would be.International law recognizes many rights protections are not absolute and may be hang up or qualified in exception circumstance s uch as wars or public emergencies or even in normal flock in the interests of certain overriding considerations1However, there are certain kinds of rights that cannot be limited. These include independence and opposeity, existity originally law, personify protection, fair and public hearing, independence of religion, and equal rights in marriage, all of which are listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).In addition to these absolute rights, the UDHR also includes definite standards regarding what constitutes permissible agents for restrain human rights protections (Mayer, 76). For example, Article 29.2 statesIn the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are situated by law solely for the purpose of securing ascrib suitable recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.2A simila r obligation is also expressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in Article 4The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.3It is clear that there are specific guidelines to restricting limits put on human rights exist so then how does Islam face to infringe upon these principles?Under international law, Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be deprived of their rights. However, there is no regulation that states that fundamental human rights may be curtailedby reference to the requirements of a particular religion (Mayer, 76). Nevertheless, human rights in the Middle East are being controlled under Sharia law and as a result, the rights that are open under international law are being qualified by standards that are not recognized in international law as lawful bases for curtailing rights (Mayer, 77). Thus, it can be concluded that Sharia law is in direct conflict with democracy and human rights.More importantly, the overall conflict lies in the relationship between culture and human rights (An-Naim, 142). Sharia law is an integral part of Muslim society as it is the personal law of Islamic society. Most of the human rights violations related to Islam are inflicted on women especially regarding Personal Status law.Women in Pre-Gulf War IraqCONDITIONS IN 1959The late 1950s were a time of great miscellanea for Iraq. After years of living under the British mandate system and the subsequent rule of a pro-British monarch, a revolutionary new regime came to advocate on July 14, 1958. Led by Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif and Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, the forces that overthrew the monarchy were united more by their distaste of the ruling regime, rather than by ideological means (Tripp, 149). Qasim quickly took vantage of his new position, consolidating power at the top of the state, and appointing himself Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Commander in Chief (Tripp, 152). The Iraq he took over was poor and underdeveloped, but under Qasim innovative laws were passed and azoic on classs were throw overboarded to organize (including the communistic Party) to address the concerns and needs of what had previously been neglected aspects of society. These organizations, though allowed to operate openly were nevertheless still beholden to the state. one such group was the League for the Defense of Womens Rights, or al-Rabita, officially recognized by the government in 1958 though it had been active underground since 1952 (Efrati, 2).Al-Rabita was funded by the Communist Party, but established by professional Iraki women to create widespread access to the kinds of opportunities which their avouch more privileged butt thou had minded(p) them (Tripp, 154). In this spirit the group focused on educational opportunities and political participation. They were also active in helping to draft and pass the Personal Status Code of 1959. Before 1959, Iraq had no civil code that addressed matters of personal status, which are of particular concern to women. The 1940s saw the first wave of educated women in Iraq, as distaff doctors and lawyers graduated from state universities (Tripp, 155). The women who had started organizing in 1952 were committed to combating issues of child marriages, polygamy, and the difficulty of divorce for women compared to the relative ease of divorce for men. These women were active in helping to draft the 1959 law and their president, Naziha al-Dulaymi, used her position as the Minister of Municipalities (and the first woman cabinet member in Iraq) to sit on the panel of specialists who prepared the law. Resista nce was square among the Sunni and Shia ulama the Sunni were afraid that the income and prestige of the ulama would suffer, while the Shia clerics saw possible codification of a civil personal law as an encroachment on the realm of their mujtahids (Efrati, 3). It is unclear why Qasims government pushed through with the groundbreaking Personal Status Law No. 188 on December 30, 1959 (Efrati, 3). A possible reason for the ruling could have been Qasims was interest in unifying Iraq, not because he was necessarily an egalitarian, but because consolidation of the state made control easier, thereby change magnitude and protecting his power base.THE LAW OF 1959The Personal Status Law was issued by decree in 1959 and contained two distinct innovationsIt unified personal status law for Sunnis and Shia.Personal status law was now codified and written into law. Judges could no longer determine the law according to their own religious cultivation they simply had to apply the new code (Brown, 5).The new law had its basis in Sharia but made expert religious opinion unnecessary, fetching control over personal status and the fate of women out of the hands of the religious leaders and putting it into the hands of the state. Underscoring how important a rift this caused among the emergent secular state and the religious clerics, author Michael Eppel writes that Shiite religious leaders opposition to this law was a catalyst in the Shiite awakening in Iraq (158). This uniform law was enacted to erase sectarian divisions and subject everyone to the same rules of the state. Important provisions of the law includedA marriage age of 18 (article 8). In special cases this could be lower to 16.Required a womans consent to her marriage (articles 4 and 6).Set forth sanity and puberty as essential to the capacity to marry (article 7). proscribed arbitrary divorce.Set strict limitations on polygamy, requiring the permission of a judge which could only be granted on two conditions 1) th e husband was financially satisfactory to support more than one married woman (article 4a) or 2) that there was some lawful benefit involved (article 4b).Stipulated that mothers had the preferential right to custody of their children. Custody was granted until the age of seven, with an fortune for the court to extend the age if necessary (article 57).Required that men and women be treated equally in matters of inheritance.Considered talaq to be invalid if communicate by a man whose mental capabilities were lacking (i.e. in cases of intoxication or anger).Allowed women to seek divorce through judicial means on grounds of injury or familial discord (Efrati and Coleman).The law was not perfect and did in fact contain many loopholes. Women activists wanted tougher punishments for forcing women to marry, a ban on polygamy and temporary marriages, as well as protection against marriage by proxy, which could undermine a womans right to consent by substituting a virile guardian. Activis ts were also upset that men retained the right of no-fault divorce, where women had to prove injury, and that a womans consent was not necessary to resume a marriage after a talaq divorce. At the same time, however, the law contained many provisions considered extremely liberal and imperfect. The inheritance law was considered a radical departure from Islamic teachings. Womens groups argued that differentiating between men and women in the issue of inheritance was not suitable for a progressive society (Efrati, 12). Women were now entering the workforce and helping to provide for the family therefore they should be allowed an equal opportunity to support their income with inheritances. When clerics decried this move, Qasim defended the provision by saying that the verse in the Koran calling for a daughters inheritance to be half that of a sons was a recommendation, and not a requirement (Coleman, 3). Whatever the reason for the creation of the 1959 uniform personal status law, its creation gave Iraqi women a vast amount of secular rights, and gave them the most progressive rights for their sex in the Arab world.CHANGES OVER TIME 1963-80The decades of the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by coup detats and political unrest in Iraq, as well as by fluctuating economic wealth and development, all of which contributed to a redefinition of womens rights. On February 8, 1963 Abd al-Salam Arif lead a coalition of nationalist Nasserite army officers and privy troupe members in a successful coup against the Qasim government, bringing a new regime into power (Eppel 202). The Arif government, comprised of cleanist and Arab nationalists, was not united on ideological grounds, and factions at bottom the parties were quickly at odds with each other. In March of 1963 they fought to amend the personal status law, instituting slight changes regarding polygamy and suppressing the provisions applicable to inheritance, replacing them with rules more harmonic with the Shar ia (Efrati, 4). Both Arif and Prime Minister Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr wanted to repeal the law completely which they saw as irreconcilable with Islamic law, but were prevented from doing so due(p) to infighting (Eppel, 216). These changes to the law proved to be temporary and were later amended in the 1970s.In 1968 yet another coup was launched, this time by the Bath party against Arifs brother, who had gained control of Iraq upon his brothers death. The Bath party stood for the power and unity of the Arab nation, and they rejected the Sunni/Shiite rift as an obstacle to this unity (Eppel, 232). In this vein they did not move to repeal the 1959 status law, in part because of its secular nature and also because they needed women to contribute to a stronger Iraq. The idea was that by empowering women personally it would encourage them to participate economically and politically. To facilitate their agenda the Bath introduced many state funded organizations aimed at redevelopment. Much lik e al-Rabita was created as a state controlled channel for womens participation in society, so too was the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) created when the Bath regime came to power in 1968 (Joseph, 182).The womens groups of the 1970s and early 80s had a reciprocal relationship with the Bath leadership. GFIW members were taught that they must serve and be loyal to the party and the state, and were encouraged to participate in a expanding public domain of social, cultural, political, and economic activities, helping to build a more solid and economically viable state (Joseph, 183). Joseph also writes that GFIW staff spent considerable time encouraging, among the membership, affection and loyalty to the head of the party and state, ibn Talal Hussein ibn Talal Hussein (183). In exchange for their loyalty to the state, the GFIW was given the role of implementing the changes in the laws of personal status, were allowed to host conferences of activist women, and were elevated in t he public eye by Saddam Husseins frequent pronouncements and public appearances lauding the work and leaders of their organization (183). The Bath never let the GFIW go unchecked women leaders were appointed by their party and its cipher was derived from the state (Joseph, 182). What is most interesting is that it was men at the top of the Bath partys power structure that set forth the goals of the GFIW. One of these goals was to go over the equality of Iraqi women with men in rights, in the economy and in the state (182). While other womens groups still operated, the GFIW took over as the main catalyst for the expression of egg-producing(prenominal) goals. With the creation of this group, women activists again channeled their energy into rectifying the changes made in 1963 to the personal status law, and to closing the loopholes resulting from the 1959 version.THE NEW PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONIn 1970, members of the General Federation of Iraqi Women decided the time was right to push for a new personal status law to replace the 1959 code and more importantly the restrictive amendments introduced in 1963. They pushed for greater reforms, and formulated a draft for a new family law that was presented to the regime in 1975 (Efrati, 4). While not all of their demands were met, several amendments to the personal status code were included in Iraqs Provisional Constitution in 1970 and 1978. Among the important changesArticle 19 declared all citizens equal before the law (regardless of sex). split up was permitted by judicial proceedings if the marriage took place before 18 years of age or without a judges approval.Forced marriages were nullified if not consummated, and divorce was allowed where the marriage was not consummated.New punishments were set for forcing marriage and for preventing marriage.Punishments were set for marriages contracted outside of the courtA man who contracted a number marriage (without judicial permission) could be imprisoned for 3-5 yea rs.A wife now had legal grounds for demanding a divorce if her husband took a second wife without permission by a judge.A woman could now have a no-fault divorce if the marriage was not yet consummated and the marriage expenses were returned to the husband.Situations under which a woman could obtain a judicial divorce were clarified and expanded, ex) adultery.Maternal custody was extended to the age of 10. At age 15 the child could choose whom to live with (Efrati, HRW and Joseph).The law still registered several shortcomings. It did not forbid marriages by proxy, did not go far enough with the maternal age of custody, and lowered the possible marriage age to 15 (from 16) if a judge saw that special circumstances prevailed. Another major blow to the desires of womens groups was that no ban on polygamy was included. Activists still opposed article 3(5) which allowed a judge to decide whether wives could be treated equally (Efrati, 7). They contended that judges were ill-equipped to make such a decision, and that equal treatment was an impossibility, citing as reinforcement the Quranic verse which states Ye will not be able to deal equally between your wives, however much you wish to do so (7). Other articles that remained unchanged from the 1959 version included articles 34, 38, and 39, which allowed for divorce outside of the court, and ensured that equal rights to divorce were not granted to women (9). Still the changes in the 1970s, though slight, did encourage the womens movement. Also, in January of 1971, Iraq ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of which provided equal protection to women under international law (HWR, 2).The central uncertainty here is why did the Bath party pay attention to womens demands for greater opportunities and rights? Women activists had been vocal about instituting change since the 1920s, and though successful in seeing the 1959 law p assed, they had not encountered many reforms since. Womens groups were partly responsible for the additions, but their activities alone do not explain the shifts in policy put into place by the Bath government. Among the new initiatives were Labor and Employment laws which passed, allowing women opportunities to participate in the civil service sector, maternity benefits that were introduced, as well as other legislation (HRW, 2). According to Human Rights Watch, the Iraqi Bureau of Statistics reported that in 1976, women represented about 38.5 portion of those in the education sector, 31 percent in the medical field, 15 percent of civil servants and 25 percent of lab technicians. Women were also accorded the right to vote in 1980. When one considers that the first female graduates of educational institutions didnt emerge until the 1940s, this participation is passing accelerated. This increased economic participation then paved the way for slight changes to the personal status la w. As Joseph writes, In so far as vent women from familial controls to participate in the labour force and the polity was needed for the state-building programme, some revision of the personal status laws became necessary and useful (184). Thus, during this time period, due to the economic expansion of the state, the regime saw fit to expand womens participation and facilitated this through political means, by amending the personal status law.WAR YEARSThe mid-eighties and 90s were a hard time for all Iraqis, and women were no exception. Two wars and a decade of U.N. sanctions ensured that womens groups had other more pressing concerns than the continued fight to amend the personal status code. In 1972, with the nationalization of Iraqs main commodity, oil, the states wealth increased and an economic boom contributed to advancement in education and the workforce for women. By the 1980s and 90s a slow-down occurred as these resources were diverted to pay for the Iran-Iraq war and la ter to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war that followed. Throughout these decades women again became a tool of the state. Whereas before they had been co-opted with political reforms, now women, under threat of personal or familial harm, were urged in the 1980s and 1990s to put the state first and family second. Loyalty to the state was absolute. Divorce was now used as a weapon of the regime. Noga Efrati writes, women were encouraged to seek judicial divorce if their husbands evaded or deserted military service, defected to the enemy side, were convicted of treason, or held foreign citizenship and refrained from returning to Iraq for more than three years (10). During these years the GFIW did manage to convince President Saddam Hussein to pass a few resolutions, in special cases, but to the advantage of only a small number of women.Women in Post-Gulf War IraqBeginning in the 1990s women started to see a hammy reversal in their personal status rights. Joseph writes that the modest legal advances for women would be precariously balanced against the costs the Bath would incur by antagonizing other constituencies (184). The constituencies he speaks of are those of the religious leaders and the tribal chiefs, the same people whose support Saddam needed to court in order to retain power throughout the wars. Saddam made a decision to embrace Islamic and tribal traditions as a political tool in order to consolidate power (HWR, 3). In this vein Saddam manipulated and created law wherever it served his political purposes. In 1988 he legalized honour killings in Iraq, permitting men to kill their wives or female relatives if they were judged to have dishonoured the family name by committing adultery, which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 4,000 Iraqi women and girls (Tripp, 227, HWR). This reversal was a concession to Shia clerics. Womens access to the public and private sectors (including education) were also cut in order to ensure jobs for men during wartime and to help appease conservative religious and tribal groups (HWR). A combination of depressed economic and political factors in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a regression of womens status and rights in Iraq, taking them back to traditional roles in the family.The 2003 Invasion and the New Iraqi ConstitutionWith the U.S. led invasion in 2003, many activists both in and outside of Iraq expected a positive change in the status of women and hoped for the restoration of a progressive personal status code. The hope was that after removing Saddam from power, a new government, guided by an egalitarian Western power (the United States) would be able to resurrect and strengthen the original personal status law of 1959, ensuring more equal rights for women. Unfortunately it has been a bumpy road for female activists. The war and its outcome have greatly reduced personal freedoms for all Iraqis, and attempts at preserving the personal status code have taken a back seat to de livery and personal safety.Progressives and women activists initially suffered a setback when in December 2003 the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), under the control of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the Shia cleric who leads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), passed Order 137 which seemed to set aside the 1959 personal status law (Brown, 6). Hakim had long been in opposition to the progressive personal status code, and used his opportunity as head of the rotating governing council to pass a measure that instilled Sharia and nullified the old code. According to Noga Efrati, women moved aggressively to fight Order 137, organizing a series of protests (1). One such protest drew activists representing 80 womens organizations, who carried placards that with slogans such as We Reject Decree 137 Which Sanctifies Sectarianism and Division in Iraqi ordination and Family (1). Womens groups also held press conferences and high-level meetings with American provisional author ities to voice their concerns over the law, which in addition to nullifying an important code, was ambiguous and dangerous in its formulate (Coleman, 3). Paul Bremer, leader of the Coalitional Provisional Authority, ended up vetoing Order 137, but the move by the Shia cleric foreshadowed the uphill fight women would have to face in a new, sectarian Iraq.In the final draft of the Constitution womens status in the new Iraq has not been clarified. In the October 2005 document, article 14 states that Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination because of sex, but it also states that no law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam (Pollitt, 1). Whose version of Islam will govern is still up for debate. The law seems to indicate that Sunnis and Shia would be free to follow their own doctrine, and because it does not explicitly repeal or reference the 1959 law, scholars say the Constitution would appear to allow the continuation of the 1959 code of personal status for those who wanted to use it (Brown, 5). Sharia law could mean the return of unrestricted polygamy, divorce by talaq, honour killings, and a public death for perpetrators of adultery (Weinberg, 1). The picture becomes even more unclear when one looks at the Supreme Federal courtroom, also established by the Constitution. This royal court will be made up of a number of judges and experts in Sharia and law (Pollitt, 1). It is unclear at this stage where there would be room for a civil court system.While the women of Iraq and the National Assembly managed to be successful in keeping the 1959 law intact, it seems that the country is destined to be divided along religious lines. Even if Iraq remains a unified country, the religious and sectarian splits in law could make adjudicating disputes incredibly difficult. What would happen in the case of a Sunni woman who is married to a Shia man? Would she have the right to visit a Sunni or secular court, or if the country reverts back to its patrimonial past, will she be forced to go to a Shia court. Perhaps she could pick whichever court is most advantageous to her cause. A Supreme Federal Court adjudicating on the basis of Sharia is also problematic for non-Muslims residing in Iraq. If Sharia is the law of the land, will non-Muslims also be subjected to it even though the constitution guarantees freedom of religion? The two main sects of Islam will most likely interpret family law differently, and women have gone from an even footing under secular law, to an unbeknownst(predicate) system that could test their resilience and forfeit their accustomed rights.Possible TransformationsThe fact is that the new Iraqi government has laid out a constitution which gives Islam a central role and which names the religion as a basic source of legislation (Pollitt, 1). Sharia has been recognized as a legitimizing factor, and therefore if women and moderates hope to advance the cause of womens rights in the new Iraq, they wi ll probably have to do so within an Islamic framework. In the recent past women in other nations have also faced a change in their status, with different outcomes.One fear is the possibility of Iraq following in Irans footsteps, which would be a disastrous blow to the womens movement and to the hopes of those that wish to see Iraq modernize. With the coming of Irans revolution in 1979 and the attainment of power by religious clerics, the countrys progressive family law was suspended and within a few months new Sharia rulings lowered the marriage age to nine, permitted polygamy, gave fathers the right to decide who their daughters could marry, permitted unilateral divorce for men but not women, and gave fathers sole custody of children in the case of divorce (Coleman, 5). While a distinct possibility, this seems to be a fate Iraq has avoided with clauses in their Constitution that guarantee women an equal footing with men. Hopefully, Iraq will follow the letter of the law and will no t suffer the same fate as Irans family law codes.Fortunately, there is precedent for a successful path to a change in womens status. Morocco and Indonesia have both seen extensive dialogue concerning their personal status codes, and each has discussed changes using Islam as a large part of their rationale. Morocco benefits from a large network of progressive nongovernmental organizations, which pushed to raise the marriage age from 15 to 18, abolish polygamy, equalize the right to divorce, and give women the right to retain custody of their children (Coleman, 5). As with Iraq, these progressive organizations were opposed by a large and vocal religious block within the country. In this case, the changes in the Sharia-based personal status laws were facilitated by a modernizing monarch, superpower Muhammad IV. He backed the reformers and in October 2003 presented Moroccos parliament with revisions to the law, defending his changes with references to the Koran and thereby placing the new law above injure from religious leaders (Weitzman, 394). Iraq may not have the NGO strength of Morocco, but with the emergence of a charismatic, forward-thinking leader, as well as pressure from womens organizations and others from below, a reform along the lines of Moroccos experience could be achieved.In the case of Indonesia, grass-roots groups have started schooling women on Islamic jurisprudence so that they may hold their own religious debates. In 2004, Musdah Mulia, the chief researcher at Indonesias Ministry of Religious Affairs, proposed changes to the existing Sharia in the areas of marriage, polygamy, and the wearing of the hijab (Coleman, 5). She defended these changes in much the same way that King Muhammad of Morocco did, through references to